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Greek law after consideration of a variety of factors set forth in the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts Law § 6 and § 188. 
The Banks then tried to circwnvent CIMLA. The Banks argued that the necessaries were 
not provided in the United States because Zemavi coordinated all of its supplying activities in 
Italy. Accordingly, CILMA would not apply and the Bank's lien would take precedence over 
Zemavi's. This line of reasoning was rejected by the Court because CILMA does not require 
that the stocking of the vessel be orchestrated in the United States. All that CILMA stipulates, 
according to the court, is that "all activities related to the provision of necessaries take place 
inside the US," and Zemavi met this requirement since "Zemavi loaded [all] goods onto the 
Vessel and provided services to the Vessel while it was in Unites States port." 463 F.3d 1210 
(11th Cir. 2006) Zemavi' s lien, therefore, was superior to the Banks'. 
Finally, the Banks argued that the judgment entered for Zemavi was miscalculated since 
the last invoice issued by Zemavi was a bill for goods and services that had already been charged 
in prior invoices. After the Vessel had stopped operating Zemavi sold all of the remaining food, 
beverage, and food service items to OWC and ROC and issued another invoice for $420,646.22. 
Once again the court rejected the Banks' argwnent. Any prior invoices issued by Zemavi were 
for services rendered during cruises that Zemavi was contractually bound to service. The fmal 
invoice was for inventory on board the Vessel which had not already been billed. 
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NEGLIGENCE IS AN ISSUE UNDER GENERAL MARITIME LAW AND 
WRECK ACT 
An agency's status as a "public entity" within the meaning of a state statute 
limiting liability of public entities, did not, by itself, confer immunity as to a 
maritime claim, and the mere fact that the agency was unsuccessful in its 
. attempt to remove the sunken boat from the river did not preclude the 
agency's status as a potentially liable "operator" under the Wreck Act. 
Michael T. Fuestings v. Lafayette Parish Bayou Vermillion Dist. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
470 F.3d 576 
(Decided November 14, 2006) 
In July 2001, appellant Michael Fuestings ("Fuestings"), suffered injuries as a result of an 
allision with a sunken shrimp boat that appellee Lafayette Parish Bayou Vermillion District 
("District") had unsuccessfully attempted to remove. Keith Griffm was the owner of the shrimp 
boat which was docked in 1994 and which ultimately sank to the riverbed after deteriorating over 
a nwnber of years. The District received permission from Griffm to attempt to remove it from 
the river but the attempt failed and the boat remained partially submerged. At no time before or 
after the District's attempted removal was the submerged shrimp boat marked with buoys or 
- 12-
lights. The allision occurred around sunset on July 3, 2001, throwing Fuesting from his boat and 
rendering him unconscious. 
Fuesting sued the District and the District's insurer, Lafayette Insurance Co. 
("Lafayette"), along with other defendants. The other defendants were dismissed from the case. 
Fuesting's allegations centered around negligence under general maritime law and the Wreck 
Act. The district court granted summary judgment as to the negligence claim because the 
Louisiana Revised Statute § 9:2798.1(B) (La. Rev. Stat. 9:2798.1), which grants statutory 
immunity to public entities for policy making or discretionary acts, was found applicable because 
the District was found to be a public entity which performed a discretionary act. Similarly, the 
district court granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment as to the Wreck Act by 
finding that the District was not an operator of the shrimp boat when it attempted to remove it 
from the river. Michael Fuestings appealed. 
On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first addressed the 
general maritime law negligence claim by looking to Workman v. City of New York, 179 U.S. 
552 (1900) which held that the New York City Fire Department could not employ a New York 
state law exempting municipal entities from tort liability to defeat a suit against it in admiralty. 
The Fifth Circuit then looked to the Supreme Court in N Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham 
County, 126 S.Ct. 1689 (2006), which endorsed the Workman's principle that municipalities do 
not enjoy Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that a 
municipality can be immune from suit if it was "acting as an arm of the State, as delineated by 
[the Supreme] Court's precedents." N Ins. Company, 126 S.Ct. at1694 (citing Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999), and Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'/ Planning Agency, 440 
U.S. 391, 400-01 (1979)). As a result of the holding, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the 
district court to consider whether the Workman principle applies. 
The Fifth Circuit then addressed the Wreck Act claim and disagreed with the district 
court's fmdings that the District was not an operator. The district court's rationale was that the 
written agreement was a mere release from liability that did not contain any statements relating 
to movement of the vessel or towage. The Fifth Circuit found this assessment too narrow 
because it ran counter to the purpose of the Wreck Act which the Fifth Circuit said was to 
facilitate the marking or removal of dangerous obstructions in navigable waters. Furthermore, the 
Fifth Circuit stated that oral contracts are valid in admiralty and that the district court erred by 
resolving this issue by reference to the written agreement alone. The Fifth Circuit ultimately 
held that an entity that enters a towing contract but subsequently fails to tow the vessel as far as 
intended does not escape operator status because of its failure. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that 
this determination is in accord with Congress's intent not to limit the pool of persons responsible 
under the Wreck Act, as well as those sources liable for cost recovery. The district court's 
decision was reversed and remanded. 
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